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Psychologie [Smedslund, 1988] represents an ambitious research program de-
signed to examine the metatheoretical Status of psychological hypotheses that are sub-
jected to empirical tests. In several areas of psychological research such äs social psy-
chology [1994a] and now, in this Journal [1994b], developmental psychology, Smedslund
claims to have discovered empirical hypotheses that in fact cannot sensibly be tested
empirically because they imply a priori true or false meanings. If correct, this criticism
would indeed be devastating. It of course makes no sense to empirically lest the hypoth-
esis that a circle is round because the definition of the circle a priori implies roundness.
Smedslund argues that many researchers commit exactly this type of error, which may
be called a Type III error. Such researchers could spend a wasted lifetime of empirically
'proving' propositions similar to the proposition that circles are round.
Is Smedslund right? I argue here that he is, in fact, not always right, and I demon-
strate that his approach may easily lead to incorrect conclusions - type IV errors - be-
cause it is based on several wrong assumptions. Smedslund tends to 'deconstruct' theo-
retical and empirical work of a researcher without taking into account the wider context
of the research program in which single papers often are embedded and from which they
derivc their specific meaning. Furthermore. he tends to be blind to the content of the re-
search that he tries to take apart. His 'logic' seems not to need Substantive knowledge to
be applied in the process of metatheoretical analysis, and in this respect it is just äs con-
tent-frec äs real logic (i.e., formal logic) is. Any valuable metatheoretical contribution,
however. is based on thorough knowledge of the content area involved. Lastly, Smeds-
lund overemphasizes the need for formal definitions. It may sometimes be fruitful to
stipulatc the provisional meaning of a concept. But formal definitions should be the
product of research on the monological network of the concept, rather than the starting
point. Popper [1979] vehemently argued against an exclusive focus on definitions in sci-
ence because of the unproductive essentialism that in the past has been the consequence
of this emphasis.
Within the limitcd spacc available here, I restrict my analysis to one of the five case
studies that Smedslund [1994b] examined. In an effort to eliminate bias in the selection
of the studies for analysis, Smedslund 'blindly' chose the first five empirical studies in
the latest issue of Chile! Development available in his university library, claiming no pre-
vious familiarity with their content. It should be clear that this method of selection does
not guarantee sufficient knowledge of the topic to be able to 'read between the lines'
and to make explicit the silent or background knowledge [Polanyi, 1973] that is presup-
posed in empirical papers of restricted length that are part of a larger research program.
The case study I consider here is of the article 'Maternal representations of attach-
ment during pregnancy predict the organization of infant-mother attachment at one
year of age' [Fonagy et al., 1991]. The article reports on a longitudinal study in which
parents' attachment representations prior to their infants' birth were related to infants'
attachment to the parents at l year after birth. Parental attachment representations
were measured by a semi-standardized interview, the Adult Attachment Interview
(AAI) [Main et al., 1985]; infants' attachments were observed in the well-known
'Strange Situation', a standardized laboratory procedure (SSP) [Ainsworth et al.. 1978].
Both assessments have been proven to be psychometrically reliable and valid [Bakcr-
mans-Kranenburg and van Uzendoorn, 1993; Waters, 1978]. The authors found concor-
dance of parental and infant attachment in 75% of their cases (n = 96). In fact. for the
first time it was shown that parental attachment representations predict the naturc of
infants' attachments äs assessed in the SSP more than l year later. The prcdictive power
is significant but not perfect (25 % of cases are exceptions). The design of the study ruled
out the possibility of the infant's behavior influencing the parental attachment represen-
tations because the latter were assessed before the birth of the baby. A weakness of the
design is the absence of a second assessment of parental altachment, at the time of the
assessment of the infant's attachment. However. the AAI has been shown to be highly
stable over time, and concurrent assessment would likely have increased the concor-
dance between parental attachment representations and infant attachment [Benoit and
Parker, in press].
It is difficult to see how the hypothesis of association between parental attachment
representations and infants' attachments could be a priori true and the outcome of this
important study tautological. First, the two concepts involve different levels of human
functioning - cognitive representations versus behavioral patterns of attachment. Sec-
ond, the two assessment measures are totally different: the AAI is an interview assess-
ment whereas the SSP is an observational System. Furthermore, the measures have been
applied more than l year apart, and correlated measurement errors seem unlikely. Third,
mental representations must, of course, exert their influence on children's development
through observable interactive behavior. The behavioral link between the two phenom-
ena has been hypothesized to be parental 'sensitive responsiveness' [van Uzendoorn, in
press]. Contrary to Smedslund's [1994b] claim, this proposition is not an assumption
made by the authors of this study nor is it addressed empirically; rather it is presented äs
a plausible hypothesis to be tested in other studies. In fact, several researchers have ac-
cepted this challenge. In a meta-analytic review of 18 AAI studies, I was not only able to
confirm the outcome of Fonagy et al.'s [1991] research. but also to show that part of the
transmission of parental to infant attachment could be accounted for by sensitive respon-
siveness. Part of the transmission remains unexplained [the 'transmission gap'; van
Uzendoorn, in press]. The meta-analysis includes a series of related studies which
Smedslund does not cite and is apparently unaware of.
How does Smedslund [1994b] proceed to show the noncontingent nature of Fonagy
et al.'s [1991] hypothesis? From the paragraph in which the authors underlake to inter-
pret their findings ('we may understand the relation ...') [Fonagy et al., 1991, p. 892],
Smedslund [1994b] derives the proposition that 'the mother-infant attachment pattern
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will be secure to the extent that the mother has an autonomous representation of
attachment' [p. 284]. This is of course not a plausible nor acceptable 'rephrasing' of the
authors' discussion. They found that parental and infant attachment corresponded in
75 % of the cases, and Smedslund incorrectly rephrases this outcome in an absolute way.
Furthermore, in framing the outcome in this way, he does not convey the authors' Inter-
pretation of this finding. The authors propose that an autonomous parental attachment
representation will more likely lead to responsive interactions with the infant than will
an insecure one; in the latter case the parents' own past attachment experiences may be
in the way of an open and undistorted communication with the infant about feelings of
stress and anxiety. It is simply not true that this Interpretation is equal to the proposition
- cast in absolute terms - that mothers having autonomous attachment representations
will be responsive to their children, äs Smedslund contends, and that therefore these
children necessarily will be securely attached. If mental representations showed a one-
to-one correspondence to behaviors, and thus could be left out of a complete explana-
tion of a psychological phenomenon, Smedslund's inference might be plausible. Such a
behavioristic reductionism, however, is not pari of attachment theory (or several other
interesting theories, for that matter). It is Smedslund's lack of knowledge of attachment
theory that misdirects bis metatheoretical analyses.
Empirical hypotheses should be falsifiable [Popper, 1979]; that is, they should leave
room for counterevidence. Is it possible to imagine autonomous parents having infants
who are insecurely attached? The answer is affirmative. In our kibbutz studies we found
that the insensitive context of the communal kibbutzim in which infants sleep in com-
mon rooms away from their parents hampers the transmission of parental attachment
representations. In this social context parents showing autonomous representations of-
ten had infants showing insecure attachment patterns [Aviezer et al., 1994]. More gener-
ally, recall, the correspondence between parental and infant attachment is found only in
75 % of the cases and because of the high reliability of the assessments mvolved, it is dif-
ficult to explain away the 25 % of cases that are mismatches on the basis of measurement
error. Is it possible. then, that an autonomous parent might not show responsive behav-
lor toward the infant? If we look at the rather modest effect sizes for the association
between parental attachment representations and parental responsiveness [van IJzen-
doorn, in press], this possibility must of course exist. Parental attachment is not tauto-
logically connected to parental responsiveness. Interactive behaviors such äs emotional
responsiveness are usually determined by multiple causes, mental representations being
only one of them. If socioeconomic circumstances force a single mother with an autono-
mous attachment representation to work full-time out of the home under stressful con-
ditions. she may be less responsive than she would be under other conditions. Her actual
Performance may be well below her potential level of competence. Whereas the mental
representation of attachment may determine the highest possible level of competence, a
parent's performance is of course influenced by multiple causes, including contextual
factors, some of which extend beyond the parent-child relationship, such äs quality of
care outside the home. Attachment theory does not assume that the transmission of at-
tachment from one generation to the next takes place in a social vacuum or that it is lo-
cated in a 'monadic' dyad.
In reconstructing the content of a study, Smedslund [1994b] often has to infer 'plau-
sible' [e.g., p. 282] defmitions of concepts used in formulating research hypotheses. From
a methodological viewpoint, it is important to know how the plausibility of these critical
inferences is guaranteed. Metatheoretical studies are not exempt from the rule of pro-
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ducing reliable and valid results. In the present case, plausibility remains closely tied to
Smedslund's personal insights and opinions. Why did he not try to validate bis 'plausi-
ble' reconstructions, for example, against a panel of experts to avoid misunderstandings,
misinterpretations, or even unfair interpretations of others' research? Empirical re-
searchers are not inclined to take metatheoretical reflections senously if metatheonsts
themselves do not do so.
Finally, Smedslund's psycho-logic reflects obsessive concern with defmitions. In bis
monograph on this approach, Smedslund [1988] tries to define 'basic' concepts such äs
awareness, activity, wants, beliefs, feelings, and actions. In fact, psycho-logic consists pn-
marily of definitions of these basic concepts, along with the implications of these defmi-
tions for psychological theory. It is sometimes useful to stipulate the content of a con-
cept, for the sake of a focused discussion. The question is, however, whether formal
definitions of basic concepts lead to progress in science or to foreclosure of the discus-
sion. Popper [1979] remained skeptical about the fruitfulness of definitions. In fact, his
theory and history of science led him to the following recommendation:
One should never quarrel about words, and never get involved m questions of termmology One
should always keep away from discussmg concepts What we are really mtcrested m. our real prob-
lems, are factual problems, or m other words, problems of theory and truth [p 310]
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